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Abstract
This paper establishes a new method of estimating public dissent, one that is both
cost efficient and adaptable. Our approach utilizes the proliferation of social media
and advances in text analysis. Twitter allows users to post short messages that can be
viewed and shared by other users, creating a network of freely and easily observable
information. Drawing data directly from Twitter, we collect tweets containing specified
words and phrases from citizens voicing dissatisfaction with their government. The
collected tweets are processed using a regular expressions based algorithm to estimate
individual dissent; which is aggregated to an overall measure of public dissent. A
comparative case study of Canada and Kenya during the summer of 2016 provides
proof of concept. Controlling for user base differences, we find there is more public
dissent in Kenya than Canada. This obvious, but necessary, result suggests that our
measure of public dissent is a better representation of each country’s internal dynamics
than other more sporadic measures. As a robustness check, we test our estimates
against real-world civil unrest events. Results shows our estimates of public dissent are
significantly predictive of civil unrest events days before they occur in both countries.
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Introduction
An implicit rule of any government is that in order to rule they require most of the people,
to follow must of the rules, most of the time. The issue is then how willing is the population
to follow the rules of the government, which requires knowing the level of dissent amongst
the populace. The importance of public dissent and collective action has been well theorized
(Tullock 1971; Tullock 1974; Kuran 1989; Gurr 2015) as well as the empirical connection
between public opinion and civil violence (Hirose et al. 2013; Blair et al. 2017). However,
despite this significance, robust and efficient methods of obtaining measures of public dissent
remain underdeveloped. Whereas previous estimates of public dissent relied on expert opinion, surveying, or other traditional methodology, this paper develops a measure of public
dissent based on data collected from Twitter. Empirical testing shows that our estimates of
public dissent are predictive of real world civil unrest events in both Canada and Kenya.
To illustrate why developing a better understanding measure of public dissent is important, let us examine what happens when its importance is ignored. Three commonly used
measures of political stability are Political Risk Services (PRS), the Business Environment
Risk Intelligence Index (BERI), and the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU). Each of these
indexes combine political, financial, and economic factors to assess a nation’s political stability (Howell, 1998). Public dissent is not explicitly accounted for in these indexes as a precise
quantitative value.
Instead political factors, such as public dissent, for each index are qualitatively determined and scored by panels of experts (Howell, 1998). These experts are usually former
diplomats, scholars, and other suitably qualified individuals. While these teams of experts
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can be quite large and knowledgeable, it is still a relatively small group of people trying to
assess an entire nation. These experts often make their decisions without a clear theoretical
foundation. Since political factors compose 33-66% of each index (Howell, 1998), if these experts are somehow misinformed, the validity of the index could be greatly affected. In turn,
this potential bias would affect all research based on these indexes. Additionally, Tetlock
(2005) shows that political forecasts based on expert opinion are only marginally better than
random chance.
The inherent issues of these measures can be seen in the country reports published prior to
public uprisings. The PRS report on Ukraine published October 2012, stated that ‘a repeat
of the Orange Revolution...is unlikely.’ and ‘Ukrainians are disillusioned but in general they
possess little appetite for protest.’ (PRS 2013, 11). Mass protests began in November 2013
and by February 2014 the Yanukovych regime had fallen. The PRS report on Tunisia,
published October 2010, called Tunisia an ‘oasis of stability’ (PRS 2011, 3) and postulated a
85% probability, the maximum probability PRS gives, that Tunisian dictator Ben Ali would
retain power for the next 18 months. By January 2011, mass protests and revolt resulted
in the dissolution of the ruling RCD party, the exile of Ben Ali to Saudi Arabia, and the
establishment of an interim government.
While it is easy to critique these forecasts with the benefit of hindsight,1 these examples
demonstrate the inherent issues in predicting outbreaks of social unrest. As noted in Blair
et al. (2017) and Bazzi et al. (2019) a primary challenge in predicting public violence is the
lack of quality supporting data. In both Ukraine and Tunisia, unrest was incited by sudden
1

It should be noted that PRS publishes monthly reports on its surveyed countries but those are only
available to its subscribers.
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unpredictable events but the dissent amongst the population was there all along but there
was no way to detect it. This paper adds to the field by developing a quantitative, efficient,
and scalable measure of public dissent using Canada and Kenya as proof of concept case
studies.

Related Literature
Traditional methods of evaluating public dissent rely on crowd sourcing, polling, surveying,
and event coding; but all have their limitations. Ungar et al. (2012) relies on expert opinion,
but instead of just a few experts Ungar et al. employ thousands, using a mixture of crowd
sourcing and simplification of complex issues. Ungar et al.’s has their army (over 2000
individuals) of forecasters assign probability estimates to specific events happening within a
given time (e.g. Q:‘Will there be an assassination attempt on Julius Caesar before March
15th ?’, A: ‘Yes, 42% probability.’), updating their predictions as needed before a deadline.
Finally, all predictions are combined to form a single aggregate forecast of an event.
Ungar et al.’s method, and prediction markets in general, are extremely effective in
harnessing the wisdom of crowds, but at the same time they are hamstrung by the simplifications needed in order to harness that wisdom. They work best when asking the crowd
simple questions, which may not capture all the nuances and complexities necessary to understand an issue. This applies especially when attempting to gauge public dissent in a
country. Additionally, in dealing with esoteric issues, there might only be a few experts with
area knowledge, which leaves this method vulnerable to the same problems as described by
Tetlock (2005). Finally, maintaining and incentivizing a large number of forecasters is likely
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to be costly and time intensive, as one must first acquire said forecasters and then wait for
them to make and adjust their judgments.
Polling and surveying provide flexible formats for assessment and when implemented
properly can be effective. Hirose et al. (2013) and Blair et al. (2017) show that assessments of public opinion are predictive of civil violence. Unfortunately, effective polling and
surveying are costly and time consuming. Wright et al. (2019) details the intricate steps
needed to conduct a rigorous survey to gauge public perceptions of government corruption in
Afghanistan. The Afghanistan Nationwide Quarterly Research survey requires significant infrastructure, relationships with local leaders, and surveyors have to be recruited and trained
on proper technique. It is not always economically feasible to conduct a high quality survey
of public opinion, especially on a continual basis.
There are also unique issue to polling and surveying that are difficult for researchers to
overcome. The biggest hurdle is one of honesty since respondents often have little incentive
to be truthful, to varying degrees of malevolence. For instance, polls and surveys are susceptible to the ‘social desirability bias,’ wherein respondents have a tendency to provide what
they perceive to be the socially acceptable answer to questions (DeMaio 1984; StephensDavidowitz 2017). This could be especially problematic if someone is being asked about
popular government entities or policies.
The issue is further intensified by the fact that many places where accurate measurement
of public dissent is most needed, might also be places where honest public speech is not safe.
According to Freedom House (2017), of the 195 countries evaluated, only 44% were regarded
as ‘free’ in regards to political rights. This means that in most countries a person might be
unwilling to provide their honest thoughts to a stranger asking about their government. On
4

the other extreme, respondents may provide strategic answers with the intent of influencing
potential policy that may be based on poll results, biasing results (Morgan and Stocken
2008). Finally, results could be biased because respondents provide false information purely
for their own trollish amusement (Stephens-Davidowitz 2017).
The rise of the internet and movement of traditional print media onto digital formats
has created new data opportunities for the study of public dissent. Event coding works by
scraping information from international news sources, specifically targeting reports related to
political violence and civil unrest (protests, riots, civil wars, etc). Previously, these databases
were meticulously hand coded (Leetaru and Schrodt 2013) but newer automated systems
have emerged. The most prominent automatic event coding systems are the Global Data
on Events, Location and Tone (GDELT) (Leetaru and Schrodt 2013) and the International
Crisis Early Warning System (ICEWS) (O’Brien 2010). These systems are useful in that
they are able to quickly process and aggregate the torrent of information the 24 news cycle
generates.
GDELT and ICEWS are not without their flaws. Both systems have a tendency to
duplicate events2 and their screening methodology remains opaque (Wang et al. 2016).
These automated event coding systems are also flawed in that they rely predominately on
online English language news reports. This makes cross country comparisons unfeasible
because the underlying data is skewed towards countries with more online English news
coverage or are just covered more by English news sources, leaving many developing countries
underrepresented. The other issue is that event coding is entirely ex-post. The focus on news
media means that very little of the signals and public motivation potentially preceding an
2

The issue seems less pronounced with ICEWS.
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event are captured before reaching headlines.

Social Media Literature
The spread of ICT (information and communication technologies) has provided a wealth of
opportunity and new challenges for researchers (Dafoe and Lyall 2015; Weidmann 2015).
Social media platforms, such as Twitter, are of particular interest and potential. Twitter,
and other micro-blogging websites, allow users to post short messages (tweets) that can
be view and shared by other users. These posts can include tags that allow users to link
posts with a common theme. This creates a vast network of information that can be freely
and publicly observed. With a current active monthly user base of over 300 million people
(Twitter, 2016) spread across the world, researchers can tap into the zeitgeist of a population.
Twitter data has already shown to be useful in several areas, often performing better
than traditional data sources. Asur and Huberman (2010) were able to use Twitter chatter
to predict film box office returns better than the industry standard. Bollen et al. (2011)
show that Twitter data can be used to forecast stock market fluctuations. Smith and Wooten
(2013) shows that people use Twitter as a source of information and were able to estimate
demand for this information. In terms of politics, O’Conner et al. (2010) and Lampos et
al. (2013) use Twitter as a more accurate source for political forecasting than traditional
polling.
There is also interesting research concerning issues of public dissent using Twitter data.
Carley et al. (2013) find that Twitter chatter increases as large scale political events unfold.
Carley et al.’s findings demonstrate that there is a tangible connection between real world
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and online behavior; people are tweeting in response to things that are happening in life.
Even in extremely repressive regimes such as Saudia Arabia, people are undeterred in posting
online dissent (Pan and Siegel 2020). This point is further reinforced by research suggesting
that Twitter can be used to assess reform efforts (Seabold et al. 2015), protest recruitment
(González-Bailón et al. 2011), protest participation (Kallus 2014), and forecasting civil
unrest events (Ramakrishnan et al. 2014). This line of research has been deemed so promising
that the US Department of Defense has funded several ongoing projects in this area (Minerva
Initiative 2014).
Some research suggests that the spread of social media platforms increase protests activity
by reducing coordination costs (Enikolopov et al. 2017). However in this capacity social
media is no different than other ICTs in terms of reducing coordination costs of collective
action (Pierskall and Hollenbach 2013; Shapiro and Siegel 2015). The important distinction
for researchers is that the content on Twitter is observable whereas other ICT platforms are
not. Because the content of a tweet is observable, the intensity of the dissent in the tweet
can be ascertained rather than merely the volume of tweets.
The central premise of this paper is that people use online platforms, specifically Twitter,
to complain about politics and express dissent against their government. A well functioning
government should be like air; if it’s working well, no one should be talking about it. The
more dysfunctional a government and its institutions are, the more demand there will be
for dissent against the government. Social media is merely the means by which they express
some of that dissent, not the cause of the dissent. By examining Twitter data directly, we
mitigate many of the issues of other measures of public dissent that rely heavily on expert
opinion, polls, surveys, or online news. Instead, we are able to develop nearly a real time
7

estimate of public dissent.
A key contribution of this paper is its data collection and processing methodology. Previous research collected Twitter data by focusing on a certain accounts (Zeitzoff 2011), a
limited set of specific keywords (Zeitzoff et al. 2015), users with known locations (SteinertThrelkeld et al. 2015; Korolov et al. 2016), or a specific hashtag (Elson et al. 2012; Larson et
al. 2019). There is nothing wrong with these approaches and they are effective in evaluating
their events of interest ex-post. However, in order to gauge the boarder notion of public
dissent a more expansive approach is needed.
Our process takes an ex-ante approach which involves capturing tweets containing language expressing public dissent based on criteria derived from theory. These tweets are
processed through regular expressions to develop a quantitative measure of public dissent
at the country level that is compatible with empirical testing and allows for cross-country
analysis using the same methodology. This methodology gives researchers more control over
the analysis than opaque natural language processing methods. A significant benefit of this
approach is its low resource cost; this entire project utilized basic computer hardware and
open-source software and had no external funding. Additionally, while the methodology of
this paper is designed to collect tweets related to public dissent, the framework is flexible
enough that it can be adapted to any area and language where data on public opinion in
required.
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Theory
For this paper the definition for public dissent and the theoretical model is from Spangler
and Smith (2015). There, dissent starts at the individual level and is any action against the
government by a member of the public. These actions include contacting representatives,
attending protests, voting for opposition parties, and other similar behaviors but also involves
publicly pointing out government failures and shortcomings. These actions are aggregated
to form public dissent, Dt . This definition of dissent is similar to Ramakrishnan el al.’s
definition of ‘civil unrest’ (2014) but is broader to capture more subtle acts of defiance.
Individual dissent is a reflection of perceived governmental quality. Every day, individuals face societal issues they themselves cannot overcome, but negatively affects their lives.
These are issues such as crime, corruption, and other societal problems (usually with public
goods characteristics) that are difficult for individuals to secure themselves and are usually
provided by governments. However, for whatever reason, the government is unable to address
the issues sufficiently for the individual. The simultaneous frustration with governmental
expectations and the inability to do anything leads the individual to do the only thing they
can do, dissent. Dissenting provides a cathartic release for the individual, making them feel
slightly better.
The individual responds to government policy and chooses their level of dissent, di,t , that
maximizes their utility. Equation (1) shows the general form of the individual’s utility from
dissent, with B the benefit from dissent, C the cost, and Pt is the probability of being caught
dissenting.
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max Ui,t = B(di,t , xi , gt , E) − Pt C(di,t , A)
di,t

(1)

where:
• di,t is dissent
• xi is activism preference
• gt is benefits from the government
• E is quality of life
• A is the punishment for dissenting
On the benefit side, an important component is an individual’s activism preference, xi .
xi represent how prone individuals are to activism and follows some distribution across a
population. For some values of xi an individual would receive disutility from dissent, so they
would elect not to, di,t = 0. Whereas higher values of xi means that the individual receives
utility from dissenting, di,t > 0. This heterogeneity among the population means that each
period for given government policy choices there is a spread of people that do not dissent
and variation in the level of dissent among those that do.
Other factors influencing the utility from dissent stem from the one’s quality of life and
the policy choices set by the government. If an individual has a high quality of life, E, and/or
receives benefits from the government, gt ; there is less for the individual to be discontent
about. E and gt reduced the utility from dissent an individual receives. The better one’s
life is, the less there is for one to dissent about.
On the cost side is the likelihood of being caught dissenting, Pt , and the severity of
punishment, A, each reducing the utility from dissent. The riskier it is to dissent and
the harsher the punishment, the less utility one will receive from it. Pt = f (Dt−1 , St ), a
10

function of total dissent from the previous period, Dt−1 and current security allocations of
the government, St . Dt−1 reduces the probability of being caught dissenting (lost in the
crowd) while St increases Pt .
Maximization of individual utility with respect to di,t yields d∗i,t , individual dissent.

d∗i,t = f (xi , gt , Ei,t , Pt , A)

(2)

From the individual, finding total dissent is just a matter of consolidating dissent across
the population, Nt .

Dt =

Nt
X

di,t

(3)

i=1

where Dt is total public dissent from the population.
A core assumption of this paper is that digital behavior is representative of real-world
behavior. By this we mean that online dissent and real-world dissent are related to another.
The online grumblings captured in our process are the same sentiments people in the realworld have but with the benefit of being easily captured digitally allowing us to form an
estimate of total public dissent.

Methods
The spread of social media, specifically Twitter, makes it possible to transition from the
theoretical model to the empirical. When people post public messages critical of their government they are voicing dissent; and the more posts they make the more they are dissenting.
11

Aggregate this across an entire nation and one can observe how dissatisfied the public is and
what the major points of contention are. In basic terms, we gather tweets critiquing either
the government or some issue under the government’s purview, and bundle them together
to create our measure of public dissent, D̂t .
Our notion of public dissent is similar to Gurr’s (2015) concept of ‘relative deprivation,’
wherein there is a difference between what their government does and what they expect their
government to do. Here we are emphasizing the public’s perceived and vocalized failings of
the government across a range of issue areas (political, economic, social) to create a single
estimate of public dissent. This is different than explicitly capturing public opinion in a poll,
because people are freely expressing it without being asked and it’s more open ended nature
with respect to breadth of potential topics. This measure can also be easily dissected than
other measures by pulling apart the aggregation and seeing what the big issues are.
This paper follows a similar method as Smith and Wooten (2013) and Carley et al.
(2013), but is expanded to capture the more open ended nature of public dissent. Figure 1
shows the Twitter data collection and processing used in this paper, from Twitter to final
dataset used in estimation.
[Figure 1 here]
The first step is to establish a connection to the Twitter API (application program
interface), which allows one to tap into Twitter’s flow of data. From there it is a matter
of pulling the relevant tweets. We created a codex of words expected to be consistent with
the language one would use to express dissent against a government. The codex acts as a
sorting mechanism, pulling all matching tweets from the stream of data. Any tweet posted,
in the entire world, containing at least one of our words is captured.
12

The sources of public dissent have been well researched. Grossman (1991), Acemoglu and
Robinson (2001), MacCulloch (2001 and 2005), Apolte (2012a) explore the role of income
inequality. Other approaches concentrate on the role of regime types (Guttman and Reuveny,
2014) or government institutions (Goldstone et al. 2010; Acemoglu et al 2010; Acemoglu
et al 2012; Fukuyama 2014). Based on this research, we developed a list of words and
phrases we consider relevant to public dissent. These are words such as: ‘police’, ‘rule of
law’, ‘corruption’, ‘unemployment’, as well as the names of important political figures and
institutions in our sample countries, Canada and Kenya. The goal is to capture tweets
representing fundamental concerns about the state of a country, not the obscure musing of
elites. For this project the codex contained 3973 words and phrases.
The codex has to be limited due to Twitter’s internal controls. At maximum only 1% of
total Twitter traffic flow can be captured at a time, collecting more severs the connection
to the API. While this may seem like a low volume of data, it is still potentially millions of
tweets and the majority of posts on Twitter are irrelevant to our purposes. A more expansive
codex would have risked running into this roadblock and ceasing the collection process.
While by no means exhaustive, the goal was initially to collect as many tweets as possible
that might be expressing dissent against the government. The authors of this paper do not
claim to be experts on either Canada or Kenya politics, but extensive research and care
was taken to ensure that the codex reflected the contemporary political landscape of each
country by examining government websites, news agencies4 , and social media posts.
Initial data collection of tweets containing words from our list began June 13, 2016 and
3

The codex is available in the supplementary materials.
For Canada: Canadian Broadcast Company, National Post and National Newswatch. For Kenya: Daily
Nation and The Star.
4
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ran to September 11, 2016. Aside from technical limitations barring collection for a longer
period, there were no a priori expectations of political events happening during this period.
Choosing to start our data collection period at a relatively random point lets us to better
test our process as a general method of gauging public dissent.

Regular Expressions
The next step is to run our collected tweets, the raw data, through regular expressions
(regex). Regular expressions allow us to go beyond a simple word count and instead account
for the context of the tweet. Regular expressions work by creating a search criteria. When
one of our collected tweets matches the regular expression the tweet is then pulled and the
relevant account information pulled (time of posting, number of retweets, age of account,
etc). An additional step in this process involved removing potential bots5 by eliminating any
tweet posted within 30 days of account creation. After 30 days Twitter’s internal controls
are decent at removing bots.
There is not an exact science behind coding regular expressions, it requires balancing
specificity and generality. Code too specifically and nothing will match the criteria. Code
too generally and the risk of false positives increases. As a rule, our regular expressions
err towards specificity. Since this is a comparative study between Canada and Kenya the
number of regular expressions for each country needed to be roughly approximate. Table 1
shows the count of regular expressions by category for each country and a brief list of what
each category entails. For this project, 474 unique regular expression were used.6
5
6

Fake accounts controlled by computers.
The full regular expression list is available in the supplementary materials.
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[Table 1 here]
Each matched regular expression, χi,t , in a tweet is counted and used to estimate individual dissent,dˆi,t .

dˆi,t =

X

χi,t

(4)

An advantage of this discrete system is that we can easily employ nonparametric statistical tests such as the Mann–Whitney and Kolmogoro-Smirnov tests to compare sample
dissent distributions. Additionally, a single tweet can contain multiple regular expressions
depending on its content. The more expressive a tweet, the more an individual is dissenting.
Take this example tweet in Figure 2 admonishing an unspecified political leader:
[Figure 2 here]
A regular expression meant to capture the dissent in this tweet would look like:

([^.?!]*)(\b(Leader)\b)([^.?!]*)(corrupt)

This regular expression would capture any tweet with ‘Leader’ and ‘corrupt’ in the same
sentence. To capture situations in which ‘corrupt’ comes before ‘Leader’ in a sentence, the
regular expression would need to be reversed.

([^.?!]*)(\b(corrupt)\b)([^.?!]*)(Leader)

To increase computational efficiency, regular expressions can be expanded to include words
that convey similar sentiments and ideas.

([^.?!]*)(\b(Leader)\b)([^.?!]*)((corrupt(ion)?)|(crook(ed)?)|(criminal))
15

This regular expression now captures any tweet with ‘Leader’ along with the words corrupt, corruption, crook, crooked, and criminal. This tweet also contains other inflammatory
statements we would want to capture with regular expressions as shown in Table 2.
[Table 2 here]
Counting the number of matched regular expression in the above tweet, then dˆi,t = 4.
This tweet is used as an example of a single tweet containing multiple points of interest, but
this is the minority of cases. During the time of study Twitter had a 140 character limit,
so most tweets only match a single regular expression. Another advantage of estimating
dissent in this fashion instead of counting tweets or users, is that this accounts for situations
in which there is a small but intense minority voicing dissent.
Estimating dissent with regular expressions this way is inline with event coding systems
discussed previously. ICEWS uses the Conflict and Mediation Event Observations (CAMEO)
scale which classifies event types and places them on a -10 to 10 intensity scale; with -10 being
open warfare and 10 being a peace treaty (Gerner et al. 2002). Zeitzoff (2011) employed
a modified CAMEO intensity scale for coding tweets in their study of the 2008-2009 Gaza
Conflict. Our method takes a step back from the CAMEO system and instead of scoring
large scale global events, we are simply scoring word groupings.
One unique aspect of Twitter, is the ability for other users to repost tweets by others
users. Here, these ‘retweets’ are essentially other Twitter users expressing the same level of
dissent as the original tweeter. Therefore, for the purposes of dissent, the number of retweets
acts as a multiplier. Including retweets also allows us to partially account for more influential
users, who would likely have their messages retweeted more than others.
Individual dissent is aggregated across the Twitter population, NT witter , to form estimates
16

of total public dissent in a country, D̂t over whatever time interval is desired: daily, weekly,
monthly, etc.

D̂t =

NTX
witter

dˆi,t

(5)

i=1

Controlling for context using regular expressions is important for several reasons. First,
location information is only known if the user voluntarily provides it on their Twitter profile,
which relatively few do. While there is a tendency for political discussions to remain with
the same national network (Zeitzoff et al. 2015), explicitly coding regular expressions to
focus on Canadian or Kenyan issues ensures we analyze the right tweets. Even if these are
tweets are coming from people outside the country, they are still discussing issues unique to
our sample countries. They could be reporters, scholars, tourists, or expatriates; more than
likely they are discussing something relevant.
Second, some words have different cultural meanings that might create bias if only a
simple word count was employed. For example, one of our code words is ‘anarchy’ and in
Kenya it is used in the traditional manner of discussing issues involving lack of government
and lawlessness. However, in Canada the vast majority of tweets containing ‘anarchy’ were
discussing the TV show Sons of Anarchy. The potential for misidentification is why single
word regular expressions were used sparingly in this paper. Single word regular expressions
were only used when collecting tweets in languages other than English (Swahili and French)
or with very specific terms used only in a negative context (e.g. ‘nairobbery’7 or ‘#cdnpoli’8 ).
The issue of translation should be minimal since in both Canada (Poblete et al. 2011) and
7
8

A colloquial expression for the high crime rate in Kenya’s capital.
A popular hashtag used for discussing Canadian politics.
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Kenya (The Economist 2014) the predominant language of choice on Twitter is English.
An alternative method of text analysis is sentiment analysis which works by evaluating
small bodies of text and determining the overall emotional content. The important words in
a text such as the adjectives, adverbs, and verbs are assigned an emotional value based on a
predetermined subjective lexicon (Pang and Lee, 2008). The count of positive and negative
words are differenced to give overall sentiment. If sentiment > 0 then positive, if sentiment
< 0 then negative, and 0 is neutral. Sentiment analysis is a useful tool and can be used
to understand public feelings concerning a subject and is used for evaluating geopolitical
events (Overbey et al. 2017) and determining public opinion of politicians (Ringsquandl and
Petkovic 2013).
An issue with sentiment analysis is its tendency towards binary response: positive or
negative. More nuanced assignments that use more of the emotional spectrum are possible
but some texts may be assigned multiple emotions or even contradictory ones depending on
their complexity which confounds conversion to a quantitative measure.
Another issue with sentiment analysis is that it is based on a subjective lexicon. It
many not be appropriate to apply a lexicon to language made outside of it’s original cultural
context (Silge and Robinson 2018). Recall the cross-national issue with the word ‘anarchy’.
The regular expressions count captures some of the emotion embodied in the text, but
our approaches gives a more robust and empirically translatable answer. By using regular
expressions we are able to tell not just when people are angry but the degree of their anger.
By not fully incorporating sentiment analysis, we do open ourselves to the potential
criticism that even with our regular expressions we are not able to fully control and quantify
the tone of a tweet. For example, how do we deal with sarcasm. To answer this criticism,
18

we feel that any tweet containing a political message, even one clearly satirical in nature,
does not happen in a vacuum. The tweet authors have encountered something in their life
that causes them to respond. The fact that they’ve responded sarcastically is just a choice
of phrasing and is inconsequential for our purposes. It only matters that they posted the
tweet. The same logic can be applied to people tweeting in defense of their government
and institutions. Again, this is not happening in a vacuum; these people are reacting to
something and we are capturing that in their tweet.9 However, as a robustness check we
include some sentiment analysis as part of our empirical findings which show that most of
our collected tweets were negative in nature.

Case Studies: Canada and Kenya
Given that this research paper is meant as a proof of concept, the scope of the empirical
analysis was limited to two sample countries: Canada and Kenya. Each country was selected
for their similarities and differences. First, English is the major language of politics, education, government, and most importantly the internet in both countries. Having a shared
language significantly reduces the potential for misidentification translation would entail.
[Figure 3 here]
Second, the populations of each country are prolific users of Twitter. In Canada there are
over 7 million monthly active users on Twitter (Statista, 2017), 19% of the total population.
In Kenya there are an estimated 700 thousand monthly active users (Kemibaro, 2014), 1.4%
of the total population. This means that Twitter provides an easy way of surveying the
political moods of large sections of the Canadian and Kenyan populations. Figure 3 shows
9

This logic also applies to critiquing retweets.
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the distribution and concentration of the analyzed tweets for users with known locations.
The distribution of tweets follows the major population centers of each country.
Finally and most importantly, there are different a priori expectations of each’s level of
public dissent. Canada is a country that often ranks among the top of nations in terms
of development, citizen happiness, and governmental transparency. Conversely, Kenya is a
developing country with a history of political instability, corruption, and ethnic tension. Most
notably, there was substantial post election violence in 2007 after the election of Mwai Kibaki
as president. This unrest resulted in the deaths of 1,200 people and displaced hundreds of
thousands (Blair 2016).
Figure 4 shows the count of political violence incidents in each from 2014 to 2017 and
Table 3 shows contrasting statistics related to political stability for each country. The data in
Figure 4 comes from the Political Instability Task Force (PITF) worldwide atrocities dataset
(Goldstone et al. 2010).
[Figure 4 here]
From Figure 4, we observe that Canada had only one instance of political violence from
2014 to 2017.10 Conversely, Kenya had 73 incidents of political violence over the same time
period, one of which was the assassination of a member of parliament.11 Table 3 contains
relevant comparative 2016 statistics between Canada and Kenya. Measurements of the
economy, political rights, corruption, and quality of life point towards drastic differences
Canada and Kenya. Given the differences between Canada and Kenya shown in Figure 4
and Table 3, a measure of public dissent should reflect these substantial differences.
10
11

A shooting at a mosque in Quebec City in January 2017.
Kenyan MP George Muchai.
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[Table 3 here]

Data and Estimation
Summary statistics from the Twitter analysis are presented in Table 3. dˆi,t refers to dissent
from a single tweet while D̂t is a weekly aggregation, D̂t =

P ˆ
di,t . From June 13, 2016 and

to September 11, 2016 we collected 45,246 tweets from Canada and 29,257 from Kenya. As
expected most tweets matched a single regular expression.

Dissent
Table 4 contains summary statistics from the Twitter data. An interesting result are the
parallels in dissent between the two countries. Median individual dissent is the same for
both countries at 1, both express dissent early in the week, and there is a mutual concern
regarding immigration and refugees (Table 6). However, beyond these initial similarities
there are stark differences.
In nominal terms, there were more Canadian tweets expressing dissent than Kenyan. This
result is because Canada has a monthly active user population roughly ten times greater than
Kenya. However, a more accurate view is to look at the proportion of the user population
dissenting. Only 0.64% of Canadian Twitter users expressed some level of dissent during
this period. Meanwhile 4.16% of Kenyan Twitter users expressed dissent, meaning relative
to their user populations significantly more Kenyans expressed dissent.
[Table 4 here]
A necessary assumption we make is that dissent scales with user population. If Canada
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and Kenya had exactly the same user population, the proportion of the population expressing
dissent would still be 0.64% and 4.16%. This is a needed in order to obtain relative estimates
of public dissent. Under this assumption, we normalize total dissent by user population,
which increases Kenyan median D̂t from 2,010 to 16,924, which is over four times higher
than Canada’s. Figure 5 shows this difference across the entire sample period, the dotted
green line representing the nominal data while the solid green line represents the scaled.
Looking at the scaled data, we observe that there is far more dissent in Kenya than Canada
over the period observed.
[Figure 5 here]
Sentiment analysis using the Bing lexicon (Silge and Robinson 2018) shows that most
tweets from both countries had an overall negative context. Given that the regular expressions were designed to capture tweets related to dissent, a predominately negative response
is expected. The minority of positive tweets were either emotionally complex or possibly
pro-government but are still relevant to our purposes as explained earlier.
An issue with the sentiment analysis is that a sizable percentage of tweets, 35.7% for
Canada and 48.6% for Kenya, were unable to be classified, meaning they used words that
were not in the lexicon. The inability to classify so many tweets demonstrates the limitations
of sentiment analysis when applying a lexicon outside its native culture.
Table 5 contains results from a Mann-Whitney U test and a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test.
Each tests whether two independent samples are pulled from populations with the same
distribution. In this context we are testing whether individual dissent in Canada and Kenya
are distributed the same. In each test, we reject the null hypothesis of matching distributions
of dissent. This indicates the presence of fundamental differences in dissent behavior between
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the two countries.
[Table 5 here]
A possible reason we see more dissent in Kenya is that the summer of 2016 was the start
of the 2017 presidential election. Elections have a tendency to raise the political awareness
of a population and highlight shortcomings of the ruling regime, potentially increasing the
level of dissent in a country. Given Kenya’s past history with election violence, tensions were
likely high and we observed this through Twitter. Table 6 shows the top 5 issues for both
countries; in Kenya the top two issues are election related.
The issue of tribalism includes tweets that specifically cited the problem of tribalism
or made derogatory comments about members of Kenya’s various tribes. Kenyan politics is
divided predominately along tribal lines, with the Kikuyu being the largest and predominate
holders of political power. The Luo are another large tribal group and represent the primary
political opposition to the Kikuyu dominated government. The post election violence in
2007 was primarily between these groups.
Prior to the data collection period beginning, there were mass protests throughout Kenya
in May 2016 concerning the belief by opposition members that the two election commissions,
the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) and the Ethics and AntiCorruption Commission (EACC), are biased in favor of the ruling party (The Economist,
2016). At the same time there were a series of suspected extrajudicial killings by police (The
BBC, 2016). We see public anger from these issues carry over into our observation period,
with many people decrying such injustices and instances of police killings. Another issue of
major concern for Kenyans was the Nairobi slum of Kibera, one of the largest slums in the
world. This is an area with poor access to civil services, extreme poverty, and high crime
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rates.
[Table 6 here]
In Canada the major issues of concern are generally first world issues: cost of living,
taxes, and generic political kvetching. Generic politics is at the top due to the popular
hashtag ‘#cdnpoli’. Canadian users often attach this hashtag when discussing any issue
related to Canadian politics. The topics tagged are quite diverse and often contain other
regular expressions but the popularity of ‘#cdnpoli’ warranted being singled out. Concern
for terrorism stems from the murder of a Canadian held hostage by Islamic extremists in the
Philippines and the Trudeau administration’s refusal to pay ransom (Vice News 2016). The
issue of immigration and refugees rose to prominence due to Canada resettling thousands of
Syrian refugees (Beauchamp 2016).
The generality of the main topics captured is important because specific demographic
information for either country is limited. Only US Twitters users have been extensively
studied, showing a tendency to be younger and better educated (Wojuik and Hughes 2019).
It is possible these trends hold elsewhere, but we don’t necessarily need them to. Table 6
shows the general nature of the issues of the captured tweets in both countries. These are
not esoteric topics of elites, but represent core national issues. This suggests we are picking
up on what the broader population in each country thinks are important issues. So while
we can’t ensure the measure is completely representative, we have taken steps to show that
it is still substantive.
One interesting trend of our analysis can be seen in Figures 5. In mid August, there is
a bump in dissent for both countries. Examination of news articles in each country during
this period reveals no significant events that would explain the spike. However, broadening
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the scope to the world level does uncover an explanatory event: The 2016 Summer Olympics
in Brazil.
[Figure 6 here]
Search history for ‘Olympics’ from Google Trends (Figure 6) for each country, confirms
that citizens from each country were interested in the Olympics. Given that the Olympics are
a major global event, it’s logical that Canadian and Kenyan would be interested. However,
that relationship alone does not explain why we see a spike in dissent during the Olympics.
A possible explanation is that there may be a spillover effect from interest in the Olympics.
Since people use Twitter as a news source (Smith and Wooten 2013; Twitter 2016), it is entirely plausible that they logged on to Twitter to see/discuss their country’s performance
in the Olympics and then stayed to discuss political events relevant to their own country.
Given that social media users tend to use the platform for all aspects of their life (Valenzuela 2013), this kind of topic drift should be expected. Since the regular expressions used
were coded to capture exclusively Canadian and Kenyan issues, this is the most plausible
explanation. This reveals an unexpected sensitivity to outside large scale events this type of
analysis might have.
To further contrast the differing levels of public dissent, Figure 7 shows Kenya’s public
dissent indexed against Canada’s. As before, the solid green line represents the scaled data
and the dotted line the nominal. Over the period of analysis, Kenya has on average 500%
more public dissent than Canada.
To put this estimate into a real world context, in May and early June 2016 there were
large scale protests across Kenya. These protests were lead by the opposition CORD party,
including presidential candidate Raila Odinga, and were against perceived corruption by
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election commissions. The protests turned violent and police cracked down and fired teargas
into the crowd (The Economist 2016). In contrast, the Canadian equivalent would be Justin
Trudeau being teargassed by RCMP mounties before the 2015 Canadian election; a scenario
that is difficult to imagine.
[Figure 7 here]
Canada’s developed economy, efficient government, and strong civil society likely factor
heavily into this result. While showing that Canada has less public dissent than Kenya may
seem like an obvious result, it is nonetheless important. The necessary disparity between
the estimates signifies that this is a valid method of cross country analysis.

Empirical Validation
To add statistical credibility to this method of assessing public dissent, we test the relationship between our estimate of public dissent and recorded civil unrest events at the daily
interval. Civil unrest events are things such as riots, protests, demonstrations, and other similar events that one would expect to be a product of public dissent. Using the ICEWS dataset,
we record the number of civil unrest incidents that occurred for each country. ICEWS is the
only available dataset that records civil unrest events for both Canada and Kenya. Because
both countries predominately use English, the issues noted earlier regarding event coding
systems are less a concern. Summary statistics for the data are in Table 7.
[Table 7 here]
We then preform a Granger Causality test to see if online public dissent portents civil
unrest events in the real world. A Granger Causality test works by comparing two linear
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models: a nested auto-regressive model with k lags and a full auto-regressive model that
also includes the independent variable of interest with k lags of each. For a given lag order,
an independent variable x Granger-causes y if it’s inclusion in a model preforms better than
the nested auto-regressive model (Granger, 1969). While we are employing a causality test,
we are not using it in an attempt to say online posts create real world actions. Instead we
are using these tests to show that our estimate is emblematic of the same underlying issues
causing people to take to the streets.

Nested: yt =α0 + α1 yt−1 ... + αk yt−k
(6)
Full: yt =α0 + α1 yt−1 ... + αk yt−k + β1 xt−1 ... + βk xt−k

For testing, daily Kenyan scaled dissent is linear and daily Canadian dissent is changed
2

1

using the inverse hyperbolic sine (IHS) transformation, log(D̂t +(D̂t +1) 2 ). In both countries
the daily series of civil unrest incidents and estimated public dissent are stationary, thus
requiring no other transformations. The IHS transformation has the same interpretation
as the standard logarithmic transformation but has the benefit of being defined at zero
(Burbidge et al., 1988) which is necessary because there are some days without observed
dissent. The differences in specification is likely due to the structural and distributional
differences in dissent noted previously in Tables 3 and 5.
Table 8 contains the results from the Granger tests for both Canada and Kenya. Results
from an Wald-test show that there is a statistically significant relationship between our
measure of public dissent and civil unrest incidents. In Canada our measure of dissent is
able to signal civil unrest events one day in advance and in Kenya it is two. This result is
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also unidirectional for both, testing for civil unrest incidents Granger causing public dissent
tweets did not yield significant results under any specification.
[Table 8 here]
It would seems that there is evidence that our measure of public dissent is tapping into
the real feelings of the populace of both countries. Recall the contrasting realities between
Canada and Kenya in Figure 4 and Table 3. Measurements of the economy, political rights,
corruption, and quality of life point towards drastic differences between Canada and Kenya.
We believe our measure of public dissent is capturing these same issues, but in a more holistic
and efficient way than other methods. Instead of relying on quarterly surveys or year end
estimates, we are able to see daily fluctuations in public dissent. The potential for rapid
response makes this a far more useful measure in identifying which countries are on the verge
of political crisis before unraveling and should be included as a factor in studies trying to
predict violent outbreaks. Furthermore, this measure of public dissent is flexible enough
that it can be scaled to whatever time interval is needed for other quantitative studies. We
believe that this paper has made a strong case for the use of Twitter data to assess public
dissent in a country. At the very least we have presented a line of research that warrants
more exploration, especially in research focusing on the prediction of civil unrest.

Conclusion
This paper has presented a new method of estimating public dissent. By collecting tweets
expressing dissent against we are able to obtain estimates of public dissent for Canada and
Kenya. After normalizing for population difference, our estimates show that Kenya likely
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has substantially higher public dissent than Canada and that our estimates are predictive
of civil unrest events. Our methodology allows for easy and comparative measurement of
public dissent in a way that is scalable across countries. Furthermore, this methodology can
be employed to study the intensity of public opinion towards other subjects.
Not only do we observe the expected difference between Canada and Kenya, but they are
different by orders of magnitude. This is an obvious and necessary result. Had their been
only a marginal difference or none at all, our methodology would be frivolous. Our results
are in line with other methods and data, highlighting the validity of this process. While
this paper used data from Twitter as its basis, the methodology could easily be employed to
other similarly structured social media platforms.
Knowing what countries are potentially in crisis is important for several reasons. First,
being able to intervene before a country falls apart is far easier than trying to reassemble
the broken pieces. Second, these failed states often become havens for criminals, terrorists,
and other misanthropes. Third, instability in one country has an unfortunate tendency to
leak beyond its borders (Braha 2012). As the whole world becomes more integrated knowing
where crisis may emerge becomes more critical.
As important as this research is, it is not impervious to criticism. First, the principle
short coming of this paper is the paper is its limited scope and time span. Resource and
technical limitations reduced the scope to only two countries and prevented a longer period
of data collection. More countries would have increased validity and with a longer collection
period it is likely we could have been able to able to capture potential seasonal effects, such
as election cycles. A longer time series would also allow for robust forecasting methods to
be employed. However, given our limitations, this paper still displays a successful proof of
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concept.
Second, this method of estimating public dissent is highly dependent upon the social
media population of a country. The smaller the population using Twitter in a country, the
less useful this estimate will be. However, growing the user base, especially in developing
countries, is a strategic goal of Twitter (Twitter 2016). The steady rise in smart phone usage
across the world (Poushter 2016) should aid Twitter’s market penetration.
Third, some governments are manipulating social media for their own benefit (King 2016;
Helmus et al. 2018). This is a concern12 but one that is likely overstated. Only a few countries
in the world have both the desire and the means to negatively affect social media platforms
outside their own territory. A social media company’s entire business is predicated upon its
ability to maintain and grow their user population. If consumers do not feel that they are
getting an honest experience on a platform, they will go elsewhere. Thus it becomes the goal
of multibillion dollar firms to counter the machinations of rogue states. Twitter has made
overtures to ensure a more authentic experience for users by purging millions of fake accounts
from the site (Confessore and Dance 2018). Internally it might actual behoove authoritarian
regimes to mitigate their manipulation and censorship of social media. Restricting social
media does not eliminate social unrest, it merely moves it to more opaque places. Social
media provides an easy sources of domestic surveillance allowing regimes to identify potential
problem areas (Lorentzen 2014; Qin et al 2017). It’s better to know what the people are
thinking than to be caught off guard such as in the Tunisia and Ukraine cases.
The final critique of using social media data is that we have selection bias because these
platforms tend to have a younger user base. This is certainly the case with Twitter users in
12

We do not suspect that our sample countries were affected by such targeting.
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Canada (Insights West 2016) and Kenya (Simon et al. 2014), where the average Twitter user
is in their twenties. However, Rothchild (2015) shows that a properly statistically weighted
non-representative sample can still be effective for estimation. Additionally, this potential
bias may even be an asset that enhances our measure. The demographic group most likely
to use social media, the young, are also the most likely to advocate for large scale political
change. Thus by forming the basis of our measure on dissent on social media, we’re actually
able to account for the group most likely to take to the streets.
The goal of this paper is not to replace traditional means of measuring public dissent.
Instead, it is meant as an enhancement incorporating societal and technological changes to
increase the accuracy of estimates. Substantive expertise is still necessary to identify key
issues, know what language people use for expressing dissent, and how to properly judge the
validity of those statements. However, using this framework would help reduce the subjective
nature of interpreting public dissent. This paper has served its purpose of providing proof
of concept for a new efficient means of estimating public dissent. Given more attention and
resources, we believe this could be a valuable avenue of further research.
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Qin, Bei and Strömberg, David and Wu, Yanhui (2017). Why does china allow freer social media? protests versus surveillance and propaganda. Journal of Economic Perspectives 31 (1), 117–40.
Ramakrishnan, Naren and Butler, Patrick and Muthiah, Sathappan and Self, Nathan and
Khandpur, Rupinder and Saraf, Parang and Wang, Wei and Cadena, Jose and Vullikanti,
Anil and Korkmaz, Gizem and others (2014). ’beating the news’ with embers: forecasting civil unrest using open source indicators. In Proceedings of the 20th ACM SIGKDD
international conference on Knowledge discovery and data mining, pp. 1799–1808. ACM.
Ringsquandl, M. and D. Petkovic (2013). Analyzing political sentiment on twitter. In AAAI
Spring Symposium: Analyzing Microtext, pp. 40–47.

35

Seabold, Skipper and Rutherford, Alex and De Backer, Olivia and Coppola, Andrea (2015).
The pulse of public opinion: using twitter data to analyze public perception of reform in
el salvador.
Shapiro, Jacob N and Siegel, David A (2015). Coordination and security: How mobile
communications affect insurgency. Journal of Peace Research 52 (3), 312–322.
Silge, Julia and Robinson, David (2018). Text Mining with R: A Tidy Approach. O’Reilly.
Simon, Tomer and Goldberg, Avishay and Aharonson-Daniel, Limor and Leykin, Dmitry and
Adini, Bruria (2014). Twitter in the cross fire—the use of social media in the westgate
mall terror attack in kenya. PloS one 9 (8), e104136.
Smith, Ben and Wooten, Jadrian (2013). Pundits: The confidence trick: Better confident
than right? Significance 10 (4), 15–18.
Spangler, Ethan and Smith, Ben (2015). A dynamic model of political stability and dissent.
In 2015 Southern Economic Association Annual Conference.
Statista (2017). Number of twitter users in canada from 2012 to 2020 (in millions). Technical
report, Statista.
Steinert-Threlkeld, Z. C., D. Mocanu, A. Vespignani, and J. Fowler (2015). Online social
networks and offline protest. EPJ Data Science 4 (1), 19.
Stephens-Davidowitz, Seth (2017). Everybody Lies. Harper Collins.
Tetlock, Philip (2005). Expert Political Judgment: How good is it? How can we know?
Princeton University Press.
The BBC (2016). Kenyans in fear of police ‘death squads’.
world-africa-36733808. Accessed: 2018-12-23.

www.bbc.com/news/

The Economist (2014). A million conversations now: Twitter in kenya. The Economist
Group.
The Economist (2016). Of kicking and kikuyu. The Economist Group.
Tullock, Gordon (1971). The paradox of revolution. Public Choice 11 (1), 89–99.
Tullock, Gordon (1974). The social dilemma: The economics of war and revolution. University publications.
Twitter (2016). Twitter annual report 2016. http://bit.ly/2yPxFDd.
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Political
Economic
Quality of Life
Society
Security
Total

Kenya
170
16
15
32
12
245

Canada
142
20
14
34
12
229

Political figures & institutions, elections, corruption
Unemployment, poverty, recession
Health, environment, pollution
Cultural issues, inequality
Terrorism, crime, national security

Table 1: Regular Expressions by Category

([ˆ.?!]*)(\b(Leader)\b)([ˆ.?!]*)((idiot(ic)?)|(stupid(ity)?)|(incompetent))
([ˆ.?!]*)(\b(Leader)\b)([ˆ.?!]*)((corrupt(ion)?)|(crook(ed)?)|(criminal))
([ˆ.?!]*)(\b(Leader)\b)([ˆ.?!]*)(tyrant)
([ˆ.?!]*)(\b(Leader)\b)([ˆ.?!]*)(impeach(ed)?)
Table 2: Example Regular Expressions

GDP per captia (2010 $US)
Human Development Index
Corruption Index
Political Rights
Life Expectancy

Canada
50,407.3
0.922
82
1
82.3

Kenya Source
1,143.4 World Bank
0.585 UN
26
Transparency International
4
Freedom House
67
World Bank

Table 3: Comparative Statistics 2016

Canada
45,136

NT witter
% User
0.64%
Population
Tweets
45,246
ˆ
Median di,t
1
Sentiment
75.1% Negative
Analysis
Most Common
Tuesday
Day
Median Weekly D̂t
4,596
*=scaled by user populations

Kenya
29,175
4.16%
29,257
1
68.9% Negative
Monday
2,010/16,924*

Table 4: Twitter Data Summary Statistics
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Mann-Whitney U Test
P-value 0.000
Kolmogoro-Smirnov Test
P-value 0.0482
Table 5: Statistical Distribution Tests

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Canada
#cdnpoli
Terrorism
Immigration/Refugees
Inflation/Prices
Taxes

Kenya
Tribalism
Election Commissions
Kibera/Slums
Immigration/Refugees
Injustice

Table 6: Top 5 Topics

Canada
Civil Unrest Events
Daily D̂t

Min
0
0

Max
72
6,894

Mean
10.78
540.7

Kenya
Civil Unrest Events
∗
Daily D̂t
*=scaled

Min
0
0

Max Mean
34
7.47
45,072 2,917

Table 7: Empirical Testing Summary Statistics

Civil Unrest Incidents

Specification
2

Lag Order
1
2

Canada
log(D̂t + (D̂t + 1) )
Kenya
D̂t
***=1% significance, *=10% significance
Table 8: Granger Causality Test
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1
2

F Statistic
3.793*
5.749***

regex

codex

Twitter API

Raw Data

Processed Data

Figure 1: Twitter Data Collection and Processing

Figure 2: Example Tweet

Figure 3: Tweet Distribution and Densities in Canada and Kenya
Incidents of Political Violence
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Figure 4: Incidents of Political Violence 2014-2017
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Figure 5: Weekly Total Dissent
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Figure 6: Daily Internet Searches for ‘Olympics’
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Figure 7: Weekly Public Dissent Index
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